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Perhaps for as long as there has been a stock market, economists have
debated whether or not stock prices rationally reflect the "intrinsic" or
fundamental values of the underlying companies. At one extreme on this issue
is the view expressed in well-known and colorful passages by Keynes that
speculative markets are no more than casinos for transferring wealth between
the lucky and unlucky. At the other is the Samuelson-Fama Efficient Market
Hypothesis that stock prices fully reflect available information and are,
therefore, the best estimates of intrinsic values. Robert Shiller has
recently entered the debate with a series of empirical studies which claim to
show that the volatility of the stock market is too large to be consistent
with rationally-determined stock prices. In this paper, we analyze the
variance-bound methodology used by Shiller and conclude that this approach
cannot be used to test the hypothesis of stock market rationality.
Resolution of the debate over stock market rationality is essentially an
empirical matter. Theory may suggest the correct null hypothesis--in this
case, that stock market prices are rational--but it cannot tell us whether or
not real-world speculative prices as seen on Wall Street or LaSalle Street are
indeed rational. As Samuelson (1965, p. 42) wrote in his seminal paper on
efficient markets:
You never get something for nothing. From a nonempirical base of
axioms, you never get empirical results. Deductive analysis cannot
determine whether the empirical properties of the stochastic model I
posit come close to resembling the empirical determinants of today's
real-world markets.
On this count, the overwhelming majority of empirical studies report
results which are consistent with stock market rationality. There is, for
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example, considerable evidence that, on average, individual stock prices
respond rationally to surprise announcements concerning firm fundamentals,
such as dividend and earnings changes, and that prices do not respond to
"non-economic" events such as cosmetic changes in accounting techniques.
Stock prices are, however, also known to be considerably more volatile than
either dividends or accounting earnings. This fact, perhaps more than any
other, has led many, both academic economists and practitioners, to the belief
that prices must be moved by waves of "speculative" optimism and pessimism
beyond what is reasonably justified by the fundamentals.2
Until recently, the belief that stock prices exhibit irrationally-high
volatility had not been formally tested. In a series of papers (1981a, 1981b,
and 1982), Robert Shiller uses seemingly powerful variance bounds tests to
show that variations in aggregate stock market prices are much too large to be
justified by the variation in subsequent dividend payments. Under the
assumption that the expected real return on the market remains essentially
constant over time, he concludes that the excess variation in stock prices
identified in his tests provides strong evidence against the Efficient Market
Hypothesis. Even if the expected real return on the market does change over
time, Shiller further concludes that the amount of variation in that rate
necessary to "save" the Efficient Market Hypothesis is so large that the
measured excess variation in stock prices cannot reasonably be attributed to
this source.
We need hardly mention the significance of such a conclusion. If
Shiller's rejection of market efficiency is sustained, then serious doubt is
cast on the validity of the most important cornerstone of modern financial
economic theory. Although often discussed in the context of profit
III
-4-
opportunities for the agile and informed investor, the issue of stock market
rationality has implications far beyond the narrow one of whether or not some
investors can beat the market. As Keynes (1936, p. 151) noted long ago, and
as is evident from the modern Q-theory of investment, changes in stock
prices--whether rationally determined or not--can have a significant impact on
real investment by firms. To reject the Efficient Market Hypothesis for
the whole stock market and at the level suggested by Shiller's analysis
implies broadly that production decisions based on stock prices will lead to
inefficient capital allocations. More generally, if the application of
rational expectations theory to the virtually "ideal" conditions provided by
the stock market fails, then what confidence can economists have in its
application to other areas of economics where there is not a large central
market with continuously-quoted prices; where entry to its use is not free;
and where shortsales are not feasible transactions?
The strength of Shiller's conclusions is derived from three elements: (i)
the apparent robustness of the variance bound methodology; (ii) the length of
the data sets used in the tests--one set has over one hundred years of
dividend and stock price data; and (iii) the large magnitude of the empirical
violation of his upper bound for the volatility of rational stock prices.
Shiller in essence relies upon elements (ii) and (iii) to argue that his
rejection of the efficient market model cannot be explained away by "mere"
sampling error alone, although Flavin (1983) and Kleidon (1983a,b) have
shown that such sampling error can have a nontrivial effect on the variance
bound test statistics.
In this paper, we focus exclusively on element (i) and conclude that
Shiller's variance bound methodology is wholely unreliable for the purpose of
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testing stock market rationality. Thus, even if his estimates contained no
sampling error at all, his findings do not constitute a rejection of the
efficient market model. To support our claim, we present an alternative
variance bound test which has the feature that observed prices will, of
necessity, be judged rational if they fail the Shiller test. That is, if
observed stock prices were to satisfy Shiller's variance bound test, then
they would be deemed irrational by our test. It would seem, therefore, that
for any set of stock market price data, the hypothesis of market rationality
can be rejected by some variance bound test.
This seeming paradox arises from differences in assumptions about the
underlying stochastic processes used to describe the evolution of dividends
and rational stock prices. Affirmative empirical evidence in support of the
class of aggregate dividend processes postulated in our variance bound test is
presented in Marsh and Merton (1983). The specific model derived and tested
in that paper significantly outperforms the univariate autoregressive model
associated with the Shiller analysis.
The Shiller variance bound test and our alternative test share in common
the null hypothesis that stock prices are rational, but differ as to the
assumed stochastic process for dividends. Since Shiller's data sets strongly
reject the joint hypothesis of his test and sustain our's, we conclude that
his variance bound test results might better be interpreted as an impressive
rejection of his model of the dividend process than as a rejection of stock
market rationality.
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II. On the Reliability of the Dividend Variance Bound Test of
Stock Market Rationality
In his June 1981 American Economic Review article, Robert Shiller (p. 434)
concludes that:
measures of stock price volatility over the past century appear to be
far too high-five to thirteen times too high--to be attributed to
new information about future real dividends if uncertainty about
future dividends is measured by the sample standard deviation of real
dividends around their long-run exponential path.
In reaching this conclusion, he relies upon a variance bound test-hereafter
called the "p* test"--which establishes an upper bound on the variance of the
level of detrended real stock prices in terms of the variance of a constructed
"ex post rational" detrended and real price series. 6 In this section, we
begin with a brief review of the development of his test and then present an
alternative variance bound test which actually reverses the direction of the
inequaLity established in the p* test. That is, the upper bound on the
variance of rationally-determined stock prices in the Shiller test is shown to
be the lower bound on that same variance in the alternative test.
The key assumptions underlying the p* test can be summarized as follows:
(S.1) Stock prices reflect investor beliefs which are rational expectations
of future dividends.
(S.2) The "real" (or inflation-adjusted) expected rate of return on the stock
market, r, is constant over time.
(S.3) Aggregate real dividends on the stock market, {D(t)}, can be
described by a finite-variance stationary stochastic process with a
deterministic exponential trend (or growth rate) which is denoted by g.
To develop the p* test from these assumptions, Shiller defines an ex post
rational detrended price per share in the market portfolio at time t :
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k+l
(1) p*(t) Z n d(t + k)
k=O
where d(s) D(s)/(l + g)S+l is the detrended dividend paid at the end
of period s and n - (1 + g)/(l + r). p*(t) is called an ex post
(detrended) rational price because it is the present value of actual
subsequent (to time t) detrended dividends. If as posited in (S.1), actual
stock prices, {P(t)}, are ex ante rational prices, then it follows from
(1) that
(2) p(t) = t[p*(t)]
for each t where p(t) P(t)/(l + g)t is the detrended real stock
price per share of the market portfolio at the beginning of period t and
Et is the expectation operator conditional on all information available
to the market as of time t.
If, as Shiller (1981a, p. 422) points out, p(t) is an ex ante rational
price, then it is also an optimal forecast of p*(t). If p(t) is such an
optimal forecast, then the forecast error, u(t) p*(t) - p(t), should be
uncorrelated with p(t). It follows therefore that under this hypothesis,
Var[p*(t)] = Var[p(t)] + Vartu(t)] > Var[p(t)]. That is, in a set of
repeated experiments where a forecast p(t) and a sequence of subsequent
dividends, d(t + k), k = 0,1,..., are "drawn," it should turn out that the
sample variance of p*(t) exceeds the sample variance of the forecast p(t).
If (detrended) dividends follow a regular stationary process, then
rationally-determined (detrended) stock prices must also. Hence, from
assumption (S.3), it follows by the Ergodic Theorem that time series ensembles
of {p(t)} and {p*(t)} can be used to test the "cross-sectional"
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proposition that Var[p*(t)] > Var[p(t)].7
To compute an estimate of p*(t) with a finite sample time period, it is,
of course, necessary to truncate the summation in (1). If, as Shiller (1981a,
p. 425) notes, the time series sample is "long enough," then a reasonable
estimate of the variance of p*(t) can be obtained from that truncated
summation. At the point of truncation, a "terminal" value, p*(T), is
assigned which is the average of the detrended stock prices over the sample
period. That is,
T-1
(3) p*(T) =[ Z p(t) ]/T
t-O
where T is the number of years in the sample period.
Under the posited conditions (S.1)-(S.3), the null hypothesis of the p*
test for rational stock prices can be written as
(4) Var[p*] > Var[p] ,
where from (1) and (3), the constructed p*(t) series used to test the
hypothesis is given by
T-t-l k+T-t
(5) p*(t) nk+i(t + k) + T p*(T) , t = 0,...T 1
k=O
As summarized by Shiller in the paragraph cited at the outset of this section,
the results reported in his Table 2 (1981a, p. 431) show that the variance
bound in (4) is grossly violated by both his Standard and Poor's 1871-1979
data set and his modified Dow Industrial 1928-1979 data set.
Although widely interpreted as a rejection of stock market rationality
(S.1),8 these findings are more precisely a rejection of the joint
hypothesis of (S.1), (S.2), and (S.3). As noted in our Introduction, Shiller
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(1981, pp. 430-433) argues that a relaxation of (S.2) to permit a time-varying
real discount rate would not produce sufficient additional variation in prices
to "explain" the large magnitude of the violation of the derived variance
bound. However, even if (S.2) were known to be true, this violation of the
bound is not a valid rejection of stock market rationality unless (S.3) is
also known to be true. Nevertheless, to some, (S.3) may appear to encompass
such a broad class of stochastic processes that any plausible real-world time
series of dividends can be well-approximated by some process within its
domain.9 If this were so, then, of course, the p* test, viewed as a test
of stock market rationality, would be robust. In fact, however, this test is
very sensitive to the posited dividend process. We show this by deriving a
variance bound test of rational stock prices that reverses the key inequality
(4). While maintaining assumptions (S.1) and (S.2) of the p* test, this
alternative test replaces (S.3) with the assumption of a different, but
equally-broad, class of dividend processes. As background for the selection
of this alternative class, we turn now to discuss some of the issues
surrounding dividend policy and the sense in which rational stock prices are a
reflection of expected future dividends, this to be followed by the derivation
of our test.
If the required expected real rate of return on the firm is constant, then
its intrinsic value per share at time t, V(t), is defined to be the present
value of the expected future real cash flows of the firm that will be
available for distribution to each of the shares currently outstanding. From
the well-known accounting identitv,0 it follows that the firm's dividend
policy must satisfy the constraint:
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(6) V(t) = Ze[ £ D(t + k)/(l + r)k+l 
t k=O
Although management can influence the intrinsic value of its firm by its
investment decisions, management has little, if any, control over the
stochastic or unanticipated changes in V(t). In sharp contrast, management
has sole responsibility for, and control over, the dividends paid by the
firm. There are, moreover, no important legal or accounting constraints on
dividend policy. Hence, subject only to the constraint given in (6), managers
have almost complete discretion and control over the choice of dividend policy.
This constraint on dividend choice is very much like the intertemporal
budget constraint on rational consumption choice in the basic lifetime
consumption decision problem for an individual. In this analogy, the
intrinsic value of the firm, V(t), corresponds to the capitalized permanent
income or wealth of the individual, and the dividend policy of the firm
corresponds to the consumption policy of the individual. Just as there are an
uncountable number of rational consumption plans which satisfy the consumer's
budget constraint for a given amount of wealth, so there are an uncountable
number of distinct dividend policies which satisfy (6) for a given intrinsic
value of the firm. Hence, like rational consumers in selecting their plans,
rational managers have a great deal of latitude in their choice of dividend
policy.l
If stock prices are rationally determined, then
(7) P(t) V(t) for all t
Hence, the only reason for a change in rational stock price is a change in
intrinsic value. Since a manager can choose any number of different dividend
policies which are consistent with a particular intrinsic value of the firm,
III
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the statement that "rational stock prices reflect expected future dividends"
needs careful interpretation. It follows from (6) and (7) that rational stock
prices will satisfy:
(8) P(t) t[ £ D(t+k)/(l + r)k + l]
k=O
Thus, rational stock price reflects expected future dividends through (8) in
the same sense that an individual's current wealth reflects his expected
future consumption through the budget constraint. Pursuing the analogy
further: if because of an exogeneous event (for example, a change in
preferences), a consumer changes his planned pattern of consumption, then it
surely does not follow from the budget constraint that this change in the
expected future time path of his consumption will cause his current wealth to
change. Just so, it does not follow from (8) that a change in dividend policy
by managers will cause a change in the current rationally-determined prices of
12
their shares. For a fixed discount rate, r, it does however follow from
(8) that an unanticipated change in a rationally-determined stock price must
necessarily cause a change in expected future dividends, and this is so for
the same feasibility reason that with a constant discount rate, an
unanticipated change in a consumer's wealth must necessarily cause a change in
his planned future consumption. In short, (8) is a constraint on future
dividends and not on current rational stock price.
Since management's choice of dividend policy clearly affects the time
series variation in observed dividends, the development of the relation
between the volatility of dividends and rational stock prices requires
analysis of the linkage between the largely-controllable dividend process and
the largely-uncontrollable process for intrinsic value.
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Unlike the theory of consumer choice, there is no generally accepted
theory of optimal dividend policy. Empirical researchers have, therefore,
relied on positive theories of dividend policy to specify their models. The
prototype for these models is the Lintner model (1956) based on stylized facts
first established by him in a classic set of interviews of managers about
their dividend policies. Briefly, these facts are: (L.1) Managers believe
that their firms should have some long-term target payout ratio; (L.2) In
setting dividends, they focus on the change in existing payouts and not on the
level; (L.3) A major unanticipated and nontransitory change in earnings would
be an important reason to change dividends; (L.4) Most managers try to avoid
making changes in dividends which stand a good chance of having to be reversed
within the near future. In summary, managers set the dividends that their
firms pay to have a target payout ratio as a long-run objective, and they
choose policies which smooth the time path of the changes in dividends
required to meet that objective.
As most textbook discussions seem to agree, these target payout ratios are
measured in terms of long-run sustainable ("permanent") earnings rather than
current earnings. In the special case where the firm's cost of capital r is
constant in real terms, real permanent earnings at time t, E(t), are related
to the firm's intrinsic value by E(t) = rV(t).
With this as background, we now develop a model of the dividend process as
an alternative to the p* test's (S.3) process. A class of dividend policies
which captures the behavior described in the Lintner interviews is given by
the rule:
N
(9) AD(t) = gD(t) + yk[AE(t - k) - gE(t - k)]
k=0
where A is the usual forward difference operator and it is assumed that
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)k > 0 for all k = 0,1,...,N . In words, managers set dividends to
grow at rate g, but deviate from this long-run growth path in response to
changes in permanent earnings that deviate from their long-run growth path.
Describing the policiy s in terms of the change in dividends rather than the
levels, and having these changes depend on changes in permanent earnings, is
motivated by Lintner's stylized facts (L.2) and (L.3). His behavioral fact
(L.4) is met in (9) by specifying the change in dividends as a moving average
of current and past changes in permanent earnings over the previous N
periods.
Equation (9) can be rewritten in terms of detrended real dividends and
permanent earnings as:
(10) Ad(t) = Z Xk Ae(t - k)
k=O
where e(s) E(s)/(l + g)s and Xk k/(1 + g)k+l. By
integrating (10),14 we can express the level of detrended dividends at
time t in terms of current and past detrended permanent earnings as:
N
(11) d(t) = Z Xke(t - k)
k=O
By inspection of (11), the dividend policies in (9) satisfy Lintner's (L.1)
condition of a long-run target payout ratio where this ratio is given by
N
o Z A Xk
0
Consider an economy in which the p* test assumptions (S.1) and (S.2) are
known to hold, but instead of (S.3), assume that (9) describes the stochastic
process for aggregate real dividends on the market portfolio. From the
assumption of a constant discount rate (S.2) and the definition of permanent
·CD)CII________11_1___1__·_______
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earnings, we have from (11) that detrended real dividends at time t can be
written as:
N
(12) d(t) = r Z X v(t - k)
k=O k
N
= r6 Z e v(t - k)
k=O k
where v(s) V(s)/(l + g)S is the detrended real intrinsic value of the firm
N
at time s and k = Xk/6 0 with Z ek 1 .
From (S.1), stock prices are known to be rationally-determined, and
therefore, it follows from (7) that p(t) v(t) for all t. Hence, from
(12), current detrended dividends can be expressed as a function of current
and past detrended stock prices: Namely,:
N
(13) d(t) = p Z kP(t - k)
k=0
where p r is the long-run or steady-state dividend-to-price ratio
on the market portfolio. 1 5 Thus, from (S.1), (S.2), and (9), detrended
aggregate real dividends are a moving average of current and past detrended
real stock prices. Moreover, under these posited conditions, the ex-post
rational price series constructed for the sample period [0,T] can be
expressed as a convex combination of the observed detrended stock prices,
p(t), t = -N,...,0,l,...,T - 1. That is, from (3) and (13), (5) can be
rewritten as:
T-1




where as is shown in the Appendix, the derived weights satisfy
T-1 T-1 2 T-1 2
tk 1; w2 < 1 + ( Wtk)/T; and Wtk > O with
k-N tktk ktkk=-N t=0 t=0
Wtk = 0 for k < t - N.
T-1
Theorem I: If, for each t, p*(t) = tk p(k) where
k=O tk
T-1 T-1 T-1 2
Z Ttk 1; tk < 1 +( Z T tk) /T; and Ttk > '
k=0 t0 t t=0
then for each and every sample path of stock price realizations,
Var(p*) < Var(p), with equality holding if and only if all
realized prices are identical in the sample t 0,...,T - 1.
The formal proof is in the Appendix. However, a brief intuitive explanation
of the theorem is as follows: For each t, t = 0,...,T - 1, p*(t) is
formally similar to a conditional expectation of a random variable p with
possible outcomes p(O),...,p(T - 1) where the {rtk} are interpreted
as conditional probabilities. Var(p*) is, therefore, similar to the variance
of the conditional expectations of p which is always strictly less than the
variance of p itself (unless, of course, Var(p) = 0).
The variance inequality in Theorem I is the exact opposite of inequality
(4) which holds that Var(p*) > Var(p). That is, if the ex post rational
price series satisfies the hypothesized conditions of Theorem I, then the p*
test inequality will be violated whether or not actual stock prices are ex
ante rational. Because Theorem I applies to each and every time path of
prices, its derived inequality Var(p*) < Var(p) holds in-sample. A
fortiori, it will obtain for any distribution of prices. Thus, even for a
"bad draw," Var(p*) will not exceed Var(p).
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Although the inequality in Theorem I is an analytic result, it does not
strictly hold for all possible sample paths of the p*(t) series generated by
the dividend process (9) and rational stock prices. By inspection of (3) and
(14), for each t, N < t < T, p*(t) is a convex combination of the
sample stock prices {p(O),...,p(T - 1)} that satisfies the hypothesized
conditions of Theorem I. However, for 0 < t < N - 1, p*(t) will depend
upon both the sample period's stock prices and one or more "out-of-sample"
stock prices {p(-N),...,p(-l)}. Hence, with the exception of one member
of the class of processes given by (9),16 Var(p*) < Var(p) need not
obtain for each and every sample path of prices. The problem created here
by out-of-sample prices is similar to the general "start-up" problem in using
a finite sample to estimate a moving average or distributed lag process.
Because only the first N of the T sample elements in the p* series
depend on out-of-sample prices, the influence of these prices on the sample
variance of p* becomes progressively smaller as the length of the sample
period is increased. Indeed, as proved in the Appendix, we have that:
Theorem II: If (S.1) and (S.2) hold and if the process for aggregate
real dividends is given by (9), then in the limit as T/N + a,
Var(p*)/Var(p) < 1 will hold almost certainly.
As noted in the Introduction, the Shiller variance bound theorem has been
widely interpreted as a test of stock market rationality. However, as with
Theorem I, Theorem II concludes that Var(p*) is a lower bound on Var(p)
whereas, the corresponding Shiller theorem concludes that Var(p*) is an
upper bound on Var(p). Both Theorem II and the Shiller theorem are
mathematically correct and both share in common the hypothesis (S.1) that
stock prices are rationally determined. Therefore, if these variance bound
theorems are interpreted as tests of stock market rationality, then we have
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the empirical paradox that this hypothesis can always be rejected. That is,
if observed stock prices were to satisfy the p* test of stock market
rationality, then this same sample of prices must fail our test, and
conversely. This finding alone casts considerable doubt on the reliability of
such variance bound theorems as tests of stock market rationality.
The apparent empirical paradox is, of course, resolved by recognizing that
each of the variance bound theorems provides a test of a different joint
hypothesis. In addition to (S.1), both theorems also assume that the real
discount rate is constant. Hence, neither (S.1) nor (S.2) of the respective
joint hypotheses is the source of each theorem's contradictory conclusion to
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the other. It therefore follows necessarily, that the class of aggregate
dividend processes (9) postulated in Theorem II is incompatible with the
Shiller theorem assumption (S.3) of a regular stationary process for detrended
aggregate dividends.9 That is, given that (S.1) and (S.2) hold,
nonstationarity of the dividend process is a necessary condition for the
validity of Theorem II20 whereas stationarity of the dividend process is a
sufficient condition for the validity of the p* test inequality (4). Thus,
the diametrically-opposite conclusions of these variance bound theorems follow
directly from the differences in their posited dividend processes.
In this light, it seems to us that if the p* test is to be interpreted as
a test of any single element of its joint hypothesis, (S.1), (S.2) and (S.3),
then it is more appropriately viewed as a test of (S.3) than of (S.1). Viewed
in this way, the previously-cited empirical findings of a large violation of
inequality (4) would appear to provide a rather impressive rejection of the
hypothesis that aggregate real dividends follow a stationary stochastic
process with a trend. As noted, Shiller has argued extensively that his
III
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results are empirically robust with respect to assumption (S.2). In a
parallel fashion, we would argue that they are also robust with respect to
(S.1). That is, even if stock prices were irrationally volatile, the amount
of irrationality required to "save" the stationarity hypothesis (S.3) is so
large that the measured five-to-thirteen times excess variation in stock
prices cannot reasonably be attributed to this source.
Perhaps the p* test might still be saved as a test of stock market
rationality if there were compelling a priori economic reasons or empirical
evidence to support a strong prior belief that aggregate dividends follow a
stationary process with a trend. We are, however, unaware of any strong
theoretical or empirical foundation for this belief. Indeed, the standard
models in the theoretical and empirical literature of both financial economics
and accounting assume that stock prices, earnings, and dividends are described
by nonstationary processes.21 In his analyses of the Shiller and other
variance bounds tests, Kleidon (1983a,b) uses regression and other time series
methods to show that the hypothesis of stationarity for the aggregate Standard
and Poor's 500 stock price, earnings, and dividend series can be rejected.
Marsh and Merton (1983) develop and test an aggregate dividend model based
on the same Lintner stylized facts used to motivate (9) here. In this model,
the dividend-to-price ratio follows a stationary process, but both the
dividend and stock price processes are themselves nonstationary. This model
is shown to significantly outperform empirically the univariate autoregressive
model (with a trend) normally associated with a stationary process. These
results not only cast further doubt on the stationarity assumption, but also
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provide affirmative evidence in support of the class of dividend processes
hypothesized in Theorems I and II.
The Marsh and Merton model can also be used to reinterpret other related
empirical findings which purport to show that stock prices are too volatile.
For example, to provide a more-visual (if less-quantitatively precise)
representation of the "excess volatility" of stock prices, Shiller (1981a, p.
422) plots the time series of the levels of actual detrended stock prices and
the constructed ex post rational prices, p*(t). By inspection of these
plots, it is readily apparent that p(t) is more volatile than p*(t).
Instead of implying "too much" stock price volatility, these plots can be
interpreted as implying that the p series has "too little" volatility to be
consistent with a dividend process which is not smoothed. They are however,
entirely consistent with rational and nonstationary stock prices and dividend
policies like (9) which smooth the dividend process.
It also appears in these plots that the levels of actual prices "revert"
toward the p trend line. In the context of (14), this apparent
correspondence in trend should not be surprising since p*(t) is n effect a
weighted sum of future actual prices which were, of course, not known to
investors at time t. The ex post "mistakes" in forecasts of these future
prices by the market at time t are, thus, "corrected" when the subsequent
"right" prices (which were already contained in p*(t) ) are revealed.22
In his latest published remarks on the plots of these time series, Shiller
(1983, p. 237) concludes:
The near-total lack of correspondence, except for trend, between the
aggregate stock price and its ex post rational counterpart (as shown
in Figure 1 of my 1981a paper) means that essentially no observed
movements in aggregate dividends were ever correctly forecast by
movements in aggregate stock prices:
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This conclusion does not, however, appear to conform to the empirical facts.
As shown in Marsh and Merton (1983), the single variable which provides, by
far, the most significant and robust forecasting power of the subsequent
year's change in aggregate dividends is the previous year's unanticipated
change in aggregate stock price.2 3
Shiller (1981a, pp. 425-427) presents a second variance bound test of
rational stock prices which uses the time series of "price innovations" which
he denotes by 6p(t) p(t) - p(t - 1) + d(t - 1) - pp(t - 1). Under
the assumption that detrended dividends have a stationary distribution, he
derives as a condition for rational stock prices that
(15) Var(d) > Var(6p)[(l + p)2 1] ,
where Var(d) and Var(Sp) denote the sample variances of the level of
detrended dividends and the innovations of price changes, respectively. As
reported in Shiller's cited Table 2, the null hypothesis of rational stock
prices seems, once again, to be grossly violated by both his data sets.
If, however, dividends are generated by a process like (9) and rational
stock prices follow a nonstationary process, then the inequality (15) is no
longer valid. If, for example, D(t) pP(t) and stock prices follow a
2
geometric Brownian motion with a variance rate given by a , then
(16) e0 [Var(d)] < e0 [Var(6p)]p2/ 2
Although inequalities (15) and (16) are not mutually inconsistent for all
parameter values, using the = 0.176 and p = 0.048 reported by
Shiller for his 1871-1979 S&P data set, we have that (15) implies that
Var(d) > .0983 Var(6p) whereas (16) implies that
Var(d) < .0744 Var(6p). Moreover, (16) was derived under the polar case
of (9) where N = 0. If, as empirically seems to be the case, managers select
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"averaging" dividend policies with N > 0, then the effect of such dividend
smoothing is to reduce Var(d), but not to reduce Var(6p). Thus, an
empirical finding that Var(d) << .0983 Var(6p) --while inconsistent with
the stationarity assumption (S.3)--is entirely consistent with rational stock
prices and the aggregate dividend process (9).
We are not alone in questioning the specification of the dividend process
in the Shiller model. In addition to the cited Kleidon analysis, Copeland
(1983) has commented on the assumption of a deterministic trend. In his reply
to Copeland, Shiller (1983, p. 236) had this to say on the specification
24
issue: "Of course, we do not literally believe with certainty all the
assumptions in the model which are the basis of testing. I did not intend to
assert in the paper that I know dividends were indeed stationary around the
historical trend." We have shown, however, that variance bound inequality (4)
is critically sensitive to the assumption of a stationary process for
aggregate dividends. If aggregate dividend policy is described by a smoothing
or averaging of intrinsic values which follow a nonstationary process, then
the misspecification of stationarity in the dividend process does not just
weaken the power of this bound as a test of stock market rationality--it
destroys it--because in that case the fundamental inequality is exactly
reversed.
In summary, the story that dividends follow a stationary process with a
trend leads to the empirical conclusion that aggregate stock prices are
grossly irrational. It has, therefore, the deep and wide-ranging implications
for economic theory and policy that follow from this conclusion. The vast
majority of empirical tests of the efficient market theory do not, however,
concur with this finding. Hence, to accept this dividend story, we must
III
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further conclude that the methodologies of these tests were sufficiently
flawed that they failed to reject this hypothesis in spite of the implied
substantial irrationality in stock prices. Similar flaws must also be
ascribed to the extensive studies in finance and accounting that claim to show
earnings, dividends, and stock prices follow nonstationary processes. If,
however, this dividend story is rejected, then the empirical violation of
inequality (4) implies nothing at all about stock market rationality. In the
spirit of Leamer's (1983) discussion of hypothesis testing, we therefore
conclude that the Shiller variance bound theorem is a wholely unreliable test
of stock market rationality because "...there are assumptions within the set
under consideration that lead to radically different conclusions." (p. 38).
-23-
III. Overview and Conclusion
In the previously-cited reply to Copeland, Shiller (1983, p. 237)
proclaims:
The challenge for advocates of the efficient markets model is to tell
a convincing story which is consistent both with observed trendiness
of dividends for a century and with the high volatility of stock
prices. They can certainly tell a story which is within the realm of
possibility, but it is hard to see how they could come up with
inspiring evidence for the model.
We believe that the theoretical and empirical analysis presented here provides
such "inspiring evidence."
Economists have long known that fluctuations in stock prices are
considerably larger than the fluctuations in aggregate consumption, national
income, the money supply, and many other similar variables whose expected
future values presumably play a part in the rational determination of stock
prices. Indeed, as noted in the Introduction, we suspect that the sympathetic
view held by some economists toward the proposition of excess stock market
volatility can largely be traced to this long-established observation. Those
who make this inference implicitly assume that the level of variability
observed in these economic variables provides the appropriate frame of
reference from which to judge the rationality of observed stock price
volatility. Although quantitatively more precise, the Shiller analysis adopts
this same perspective when it asks: "If stock prices are rational, then why
are they so volatile (relative to dividends)?" The apparent answer is that
stock prices are not rational.
Our analysis turns this perspective "on its head" by asking: "If stock
prices are rational, then why do dividends exhibit so little volatility
(relative to stock prices)?" Our answer is simply that managers choose
III
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dividend policies so as to smooth the effect of changes in intrinsic values
(and hence, rational stock prices) on the change in dividends. The a priori
economic arguments and empirical support presented for this conclusion surely
need no repeating. We would note, however, that this explanation is likely to
also apply to the time series of other economic flow variables. There are,
for example, good economic reasons for believing that aggregate accounting
earnings, investment, and consumption have in common with dividends that their
changes are smoothed either by the behavior of the economic agents that
control them or by the statistical methods which are used to measure them. An
initial examination of the data appears to support this belief. If a thorough
empirical evaluation confirms this finding, then our analysis casts doubt in
general over the use of volatility comparisons between stock prices and
economic variables which are not also speculative- prices, as a methodology to
test stock market rationality.
In summary of our view of the current state of the debate over the
efficient market theory, Paul Samuelson said it well when he addressed the
practicing investment managers of the financial community a decade ago (1974):
Indeed, to reveal my bias, the ball is in the court of the practical
men: it is the turn of the Mountain to take a first step toward the
theoretical Mohammed ... If you oversimplify the debate, it can be
put in the form of the question,
Resolved, that the best of money managers cannot be
demonstrated to be able to deliver the goods of superior
portfolio-selection performance.
Any jury that reviews the evidence, and there is a great deal of
relevant evidence, must at least come out with the Scottish verdict:
Superior Investment performance is unproved.
Just so, our evidence does not prove that the market is efficient, but-it
does at least warrant the Scottish verdict:
-25-
Excess stock price volatility is unproved.
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1 To be sure, of the hundreds of tests of efficient markets, there have been
a few which appear to reject market efficiency (cf. "Symposium on Some
Anomalous Evidence on Capital Market Efficiency," Journal of Financial
Economics (June-September 1978)]. For the most part, however, these
studies are joint tests of both market efficiency and a particular
equilibrium model of differential expected returns across stocks such as
the Capital Asset Pricing Model, and therefore, rejection of the joint
hypothesis may not imply a rejection of market efficiency. Even in their
strongest interpretation, such studies have at most rejected market
efficiency for select segments of the market.
2 For example, in discussing the problems of Tobin's Q theory in explaining
investment, Bosworth (1975, p. 286) writes "Nor does it seem reasonable to
believe that the present value of expected corporate income actually fell
in 1973-1974 by the magnitude implied by the stock-market decline of that
period, when q declined by 50 percent. ... As long as management is
concerned about long-run market value and believes that this value
reflects 'fundamentals,' it would not scrap investment plans in response
to the highly volatile short-run changes in stock prices."
3 Using the variance bound methodology, LeRoy and Porter (1981) claim to
show that stock prices are "too volatile" relative to accounting
earnings. For a similar discussion of their analysis, see Marsh and
Merton (1984).
4 For a recent discussion of the "causal" effect of stock price changes on
investment, see Fischer and Merton (1984).
5 Shiller (1981a, p. 434) notes on this general point: "The lower bound of
a 95 percent one-sided confidence interval for the standard
deviation of annual changes in real stock prices is over five times higher
than the upper bound allowed by our measure of the observed variability of
real dividends. The failure of the efficient markets model is thus so
dramatic that it would seem impossible to attribute the failure to such
things as data errors, price index problems, or changes in tax laws."
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6 Shiller also develops a second variance bound test which establishes an
upper bound on the variance of unanticipated changes in detrended real
stock prices in terms of the variance of detrended real dividends. A
brief analysis of this "innovations test" is presented in Section II.
T-1 -2
7 That is, the time series estimator Z [p(t) - p /T can be used to
0
estimate Var[p(t)] and similarly, for p*(t).
8 As a recent example, see Tobin (1984).
9 This belief may perhaps explain why Shiller devotes twenty percent of his
paper (1981a) to justify the robustness of his findings with respect to
assumption (S.2) and virtually no space to justifying (S.3).
10 The cash flow accounting identity applies only to dividends paid net of
any issues or purchases of its outstanding securities. "Gross" dividends
are, of course, subject to no constraint. Hence, all references to
"dividends" throughout the paper are to "net" dividends paid.
11 The fact that individual firms pursue dividend policies which are vastly
different from one another is empirical evidence consistent with this view.
12 By the accounting identity, "net" dividend policy (as described in
footnote 9) cannot be changed without changing the firm's investment
policy. However, changes in investment policy need not change the current
intrinsic value of the firm. Managers can implement virtually any change
in net dividends per share (without affecting the firm's intrinsic value)
by the purchase or sale of financial assets held by the firm or by
marginal changes in the amount of investment in any other "zero net
present value" asset held by the firm (e.g., inventories). Such
transactions will change the composition of the firm's assets and the time
pattern of its future cash flows, but not the present value of the future
cash flows. Since these "trivial" changes in investment policy will not
affect the intrinsic value of the firm, they will not affect the current
level of rationally-determined stock price.
13 Indeed, the classic Miller-Modigliani (1961) theory of dividends holds
that dividend policy is irrelevant, and hence, in this case, there is no
optimal policy.
14 The constant of integration must be zero since e(t) = 0 implies that
V(t) = 0 which implies that e(t + s) = 0 and d(t + s) = 0 for all
s > 0.
15 The target payout ratio and the long-run growth rate g are related
by g = r - p = (1 - 6)r.
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16 The exception is the polar case of (9) where N 0 and managers choose a
dividend policy so as to maintain a target payout ratio in both the short
and long runs.- In this case, with d(t) = pp(t) for all t, we have
the stronger analytic proposition that the Shiller variance bound
inequality (4) must be violated in all samples if stock prices are
rational.
17 For example, if all in-sample prices happened to be the same (i.e.,
p(t) - p, t 0,...,T - 1), but the out-of-sample prices were not, then
for that particular sample path, Var(p*) > Var(p) 0.
18 Since the two theorems share the assumption (S.2) and for any sample of
prices, one must fail, they cannot reliably be used to test this
hypothesis either. However, as Fama (1977) and Myers and Turnbull (1977)
have shown, we note that a constant discount rate is inconsistent with a
stationary process for dividends when investors are risk averse. Hence,
the assumptions (S.2) and (S.3) are a priori, mutually inconsistent.
19 If V(t) follows a stationary process and the dividend process is given
by (9), then the innovations or unanticipated changes in intrinsic value,
AV(t) + D(t) - rV(t), will not form a martingale as is required by (6).
If, as is necessary for the validity of (9), the intrinsic value follows a
nonstationary process, then from (6) and (7), both dividends and rational
stock prices must also be nonstationary.
20 If p(t) and d(t) follow nonstationary processes, the variances of the
price and dividend are, of course, not well-defined in the time series
sense that they were used in Shiller's variance bound test. However,
Var(p*) and Var(p) can be simply treated as sample statistics
constructed from the random variables {p(t)} and {d(t)}, and
for any finite T, the conditional moments of their distributions will
exist. If, moreover, the processes are such that the dividend-to-price
ratio coverages to a finite-variance steady-state distribution, then the
conditional expectation of the variance bound inequality as expressed in
Theorem II, cO[Var(p*)/Var(p)], will exist even in the limit as
T .
21 In financial economics, the standard assumption is that the per period
rate of return on stocks is independently and identically distributed over
time. Together with limited liability on stock ownership, this implies a
geometric Brownian motion model for stock prices which is not, of course,
a stationary process. There is a long-standing and almost uniform
agreement in the accounting literature that accounting earnings (either
real or nominal) can best be described by a nonstationary process (cf.
Foster (1978, Chapter 4)).
22 The strength of this apparent reversion to trend is further accentuated by
using the ex post or in-sample trend of stock prices to detrend both the
actual stock price and the p*(t) time series.
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23 As shown in Fischer and Merton (1984), in addition to predicting dividend
changes, aggregate real stock price changes are among the better
forecasters of future changes in business cycle variables including GNP,
corporate earnings, and business fixed investment. These empirical
findings might also be counted in the support of the hypothesis of stock
market rationality.
24 We surely echo this view with respect to our own dividend model (9). We
do not however, assert that the variance bound condition of Theorem I and




PROOF OF THEOREM I:
Define H as the T x T matrix of elements tk in Theorem I, so
that p* = ip . We show that:
Var(Hp) < Var(p) (A.1)
if and only if:
1 1'
I1[ (I- T ) ]kll 1 (A.2)
1 1'
where [ (I T )H ]k is defined as the k'th column of the
1 1'
T x T matrix (I - ), and Var(.) is the usual sample
variance operator. Note that condition (A.2) may be re-expressed, as in the
statement of Theorem I, as:
T-1 T-1
tk r( < Tk ) / (A.2a)
t0 t t=O
Necessity is easily proved. Let uk be a basis vector with zeros
everywhere except for a one in the k'th position. Then the k'th column of
1 1'
[(I --- fT )HI is defined as:
1 1'
Xk = (I T )H k (A.3)
1 1'
=> Xkl 12 = 11 (I -T ) u II (A.4)
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But, applying (A.1) to the case = k :
1'
11(I - T ) U-k1 2 < i T 1 2 < 2 = ITI u-k -k (A.5)
To prove sufficiency, let be any arbitrary vector which can be
decomposed into a mean vector and a vector of deviations around that mean.
That is:
= 2 + P (A.6)
where
1 1'
( + ') (I - )n(2 + p1) <
1 1'
(P + ,)(I )(1
which implies:
1 1'









because has a zero mean. Then, from (A.8) and (A.9):
1' 2
II(I - T )II 111 2
1 1'
= 4Et(I T )P1 <
Using the definition that k is a vector with one in the k'th position and zeros
elsewhere:
T-1








~i => C1k0k za(A.11)
k=O
Then, by the Minkowski inequality:
1 1' 2 T-l1 11'
T 1 Z I(I T n(k-)11k=O
T-1 1 1' 2
a2[(I - T)k 2 (A.12)T .1kk=0
T-1 2l2
k=O k Ikl
Thus, (A.2) is sufficient for:
1 1' 21 1 T-1
I I(z , ) 21lil Pi ( T ) 1 C =Ok k -ipl Ip (A.13)
=> T Var(np) < T Var(2) (A.14)
=> Var(I2) < Var(2) (A.15)
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM II:
Using the definition of the (detrended) ex post rational price, p*(t),
given in (5) in the text, and allowing (detrended) dividends to be a general
distributed lag of (detrended) prices as in (13) in the text, ex post rational
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where a = 1/(1 + p), and the level of dividends is a distributed lag of the
N
level of past prices, as in (13), i.e., d(t) - p Z
k=0
ekp(t - k).
(A.16) may be conveniently rewritten as:
p* = [A1 + A201]p (A.17)
where A1 is the first matrix on the RHS of (A.16), (i.e., the matrix which
involves multipliction by the scalar 1/T), A2 is the next matrix, which
involves multiplication by the scalar p, and is the matrix which




















contains the elements e1, 2, ... SN. The weights in the matrix
Al reflect the contribution 1/T of each of the observed prices
[p(T - l),...,p(O)] to p*(T) in accordance with (3), together with the
weight [1/( + )]T-t attached to p*(T) in the determination of
p*(t) in (5). The matrix A2 contains the discount weights which (5)
places on dividends as components of each p*(t), while contains the
distributed lag weights of dividends on past prices, as given in (13). Using
these definitions of Al, A2, and , (A.17) is equivalent to:
P* wP (A.18)
where W - [wtk], the wtk being those defined in (14) in the text.
The elements of W satisfy the conditions stipulated in the text. By
inspection, (A1 + A2) satisfies the conditions, and hence, given the
structure of , (A1 + A20) will also.
Suppose that the (T + N) vector is decomposed into a vector p 
and a vector l1, where p is the mean of p(j), j -N,...,T - 1, and
P21 contains the deviations about the mean, just as in the proof of Theorem
I. Then:
p* = [A1 + A20[P + 1 ] (A.19)
= [A1 + A20]p + [A1 + A2O]. 1 (A.20)
- A1p 1 + A2Op 1 + Alp1 + A202 1 (A.21)
Since the row elements of A1 are constant, Al. 1 = 0. Also, since
the row elements of sum to unity, A20p 1 = A2p 1. Thus, (A.21)
simplifies to:
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p* = [A1 + A2]p 1 + A202 1 (A.22)
= p 1 + A2 (since the row elements of (A.23)
(A1 + A2) sum to unity)
From (A.23):
1 1'
Var(p*) T+N (P'A2+ p 1')( I 1 T )(P 1 + A ) (A.24)T ( 2E)1
1 1'
T+N Pi O'Ai( I T )A2®2 1 (A.25)
By inspection of (A.16), the row elements of A2 are positive, sum to
unity or less than unity, and have a norm less than unity. Thus, by using
Theorem I twice, we have that:
1 1'1 11'
Var(p*) T*N i ' I _Z T+N 1 - - T+N )1 
(A.26)
=> Var(p*) < T+N P-l = Var(p)
(A.26) can be interpreted as an extension of the inequality in Theorem I
to the case where a (T + N) vector of sample and pre-sample prices is mapped
into a T vector of an ex post rational prices. However, in the market
rationality tests, the variance of the ex post rational prices is compared not
to the variance of the (T + N) vector of T observed and N pre-sample
prices, but to the variance of only the T observed prices. Partitioning of
the (T + N) prices into in-sample and out-of-sample prices, it is
straightforward to show that:
Var(p*) T.N (PT-PN) N Var(pT)-Var(PN (A.27)





PT = Z p(t)
t=O
-1
PN = z p(t)
t--N
T-1
Var(pT) Z [p(t)- pT2/T
-1 2
Var(pN) Z [p(t) - pN]/N
If the sum of the last two terms on the RHS of (A.27) is nonpositive,
Var(p*) < Var(pT), and our "variance bound test" will hold analytically
for all such sample paths. For given T and N, the start-up effects of
out-of-sample prices are less important the more the (unobserved) pre-sample
prices "look like" the sample prices (e.g., if PT PN and Var(pT) =
Var(pN), the adjustments vanish). -
The sum of the last two terms on the RHS of (A.27) can be positive for
some sample paths (if N is very different from PT while at the same
time Var(pN) is bigger than Var(pT)). However, for a given N, and
irrespective of whether (detrended) prices are stationary or non-stationary,
it is clear that almost surely for every sample path, the start-up adjustment
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